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Abstract.
Anhomomorphic logic is a new interpretation of Quantum Theory (due to R. Sorkin). It is a
histories formulation (c.f. consistent histories, quantum measure theory). In this approach,
reality is a co-event, which is essentially an assignment of a truth value {True, False} to each
question. The way this assignment is done mimics classical physics in as much as possible,
allowing however for sufficient flexibility to accommodate quantum ‘paradoxes’, as is shown
by the analysis of Kochen-Specker theorem. In this contribution, after briefly reviewing the
approach, we will examine how probabilistic predictions can arise. The Cournot principle
and the use of approximate preclusions will play a crucial role. Facing similar problems in
interpreting probability as in classical probability theory, we will resort to the weak form
of Cournot principle, where possible realities will be preclusive co-events and the quantum
measure is used to obtain predictions. Examples considered, includes the fair coin and the
double slit pattern arguably one of the most important paradigms for quantum theory.
1. Introduction
Quantum theory challenges the picture we had in classical physics about what reality is. In
order to retain the classical picture alternative formulations, such as hidden variables, were
proposed, facing however serious problems due to the severe restrictions from observations
that result from Bell’s inequalities [1] and the Kochen-Specker theorem [2]. Quantum theory
(as it stands now) requires some external (to the system) observer, in order to “make sense”.
However, for the needs of quantum cosmology for example, where we have a truly closed system,
1 Based on talk given by P. Wallden at the DICE 2008 conference
we do lack an interpretation. Consistent histories [3, 4, 5], can be seen as an attempt to deal with
this, that also removed in some way the very special role that time has in standard quantum
theory. The latter is another desired feature, if one is interested in building a quantum theory of
gravity where time is in same footing with space. Consistent histories however, failed to provide
a fully satisfactory interpretation of the quantum theory of closed systems due to the context
dependence ( or else the dependence of predictions on the consistent set realized, which arises
due to the fact that there exist many incompatible consistent sets). As a development came a
novel interpretation which retains essentially the same mathematical structure (history space
and decoherence functional) the so-called, anhomomorphic logic 2 [6, 7]. In the next section
we introduce this approach briefly, before we come back to the core of this contribution, which
is how probabilistic predictions are dealt within this approach3.
2. Introducing Anhomomorphic Logic
2.1. Classical Physics, Histories and Logic
Let us first consider classical physics, in which we use Histories and (classical) Logic in order
to ask questions about nature.
We have a set Ω (call it History Space) of all possible histories hi. We can think of each
hi as a trajectory (or more generally a full specification of the particle in every moment of
time). In classical physics one and only one of these histories is actually realized. However,
in stochastic physics (non-deterministic) we do not know which one is realized, but have a
probability measure on Ω4. All possible questions about a system can now be rephrased in
terms of asking whether the real history belongs to some subset of Ω. So for example if we
want to ask whether the particle is at the interval ∆ at time t, we ask if the realized history h
belongs to the subset ∆t := {hi|hi(t) ∈ ∆} ⊂ Ω.
Associated with Ω is its power set U (set of subsets of Ω), that has a Boolean algebra
structure with intersection as multiplication and symmetric difference (A△B := (A∪B)\ (A∩
B)) as addition.
We also have the set of truth values T ( e.g. {True, False}) which also has a Boolean
algebra structure (that of Z2, identifying ‘True’ with 1 and ‘False’ with 0). Finally we have
the possible valuations φi. A valuation, φi is an assignment of a truth value to each question,
i.e. in other words a map from U to T . We moreover require that this valuation respects the
Boolean structures of U and T by being a homomorphism:
φ(A△B) = φ(A) + φ(B)
φ(A ∩B) = φ(A)φ(B) (1)
It can be shown that if one requires the maps φ to be homomorphic there is a one to one
correspondence between these homomorphic maps and single histories, i.e. each homomorphism
corresponds to a characteristic map of a history:
φi|φi(A) = 1 iff hi ∈ A (2)
2 Also known with different names as for example “co-event interpretation”.
3 More details can be found in Ref. [8].
4 Histories that have measure zero, are never realized, and thus are not even possible realities. This will be of
use later.
2.2. Consistent Histories and Quantum Measure
In quantum theory the above picture does not hold. The only fully developed histories
formulation (at present) is the consistent histories approach (also known as decoherent histories)
Ref. [3, 4, 5]5. The basic elements are histories of the system and to each pair of histories a
complex number is assigned by the means of the decoherence functional and it corresponds to
the interference between these histories. It is defined as:
D(A,B) = D∗(B,A)
D(A ⊔B,C) = D(A,C) +D(B,C)
D(A,A) ≥ 0∑
h,h′
D(h, h′) = 1 (3)
The diagonal elements correspond to candidate probabilities and under certain circumstances6
we can interpret this (real) number as the probability of this history (or in general coarse
grained history i.e. subset of histories) actually occuring (this probability is conditional on the
classical domain, or consistent set, that is actually realized). For more details the reader is
referred to the original references [3, 4, 5].
This candidate probability interpretation led R. Sorkin to think of the diagnoal elements
of a decoherence functional as a quantum measure, as they mimic some of the properties of a
classical measure, and can be thought of as the first step in a chain of generalizations of classical
measure theory (see Refs. [9, 10]). We will use the notation µ(A) := D(A,A) for the quantum
measure. While it is normalized to unity and is positive-definite, it fails to obey the “additivity
of disjoint regions of the sample space”, a necessary requirement to have a probability measure,
µ(A ⊔B) 6= µ(A) + µ(B) (4)
This is due to interference (c.f. double slit). Note though that the quantum measure does obey
the weaker
µ(A ⊔B ⊔ C) = µ(A ⊔B) + µ(A ⊔ C) + µ(B ⊔ C)− µ(A)− µ(B)− µ(C) (5)
Which means that in quantum theory, there is no fundamentally new three paths interference.
In particular, it can be shown that any quantum measure that obeys Eq. (5) can arise from
some decoherence functional (as defined above, and thus the equivalence between quantum
measures and decoherence functionals.).
Due to the difference of the quantum measure compared to classical measure, the picture
of classical histories and logic analyzed in the previous section, cannot be retained. The most
striking problem, comes essentially from the Kochen-Specker theorem, and is discussed in Ref.
[11]. A simplified version form of this problem comes from the three slit experiment, where
we have µ(A ⊔ B) = µ(B ⊔ C) = 0 but µ(A ⊔ C) 6= 0. The first two imply that all the set
{A,B,C} is impossible (since it is covered by measure zero sets), however one subset, {A,C},
is possible.
5 Mathematically is very close to the well known sum-over-histories formalism of Feynman, but the interpretation
is quite different
6 If it belongs to a partition that the elements pairwise have zero interference.
2.3. Anhomomorphic Logic
We can see now that in order to be compatible with quantum theory, one needs to alter
something in the classical picture. Anhomomrphic logic is the approach where we maintain
the same set of possible questions (namely U), same possible truth values (T = {True, False})
but we change the allowed valuation maps, φi, by weakening the requirement the map is
a homomorphism. These maps (no longer homomorphic) are called co-events. This approach
was initiated by R. Sorkin in Refs. [6, 7]. As already stated, F. Dowker and Y. Ghazi-Tabatabai
in Ref. [11] showed how the suggested approach evades Kochen-Specker theorem7 and thus is
a good candidate for a realistic interpretation of quantum theory.
While we want to weaken the requirement to be homomorphism we need it to maintain
sufficient structure to be able to make deductions (deductive logic), retain some sense of reality
and in the same time be able to accommodate the paradoxes of quantum theory. There are
three conditions we require.
(i) We retain the preservation of multiplication under φ but no longer require the preservation
addition in general,
φ(A ∩B) = φ(A)φ(B)
φ(A△B) 6= φ(A) + φ(B) (6)
This is called multiplicative co-event8. It has the following desirable properties.
(a)
φ(A) = 1 and A ⊂ B ⇒ φ(B) = 1 (7)
This is the basic inference rule (“modus ponens”), and can be used to make deductive
proofs9. However we cannot use proofs by contradiction (excluded middle), since
φ(A) = 0; φ(Ω \ A) = 1 (8)
This is the case in intuitionistic logic also (see also constructive mathematics for
mathematics using only deductive proofs). Note though, that the following does hold:
φ(A) = 1⇒ φ(Ω \ A) = 0 (9)
(b) It can be shown, that each multiplicative co-event10 φA corresponds to a subset A
called dual of the co-event11, such that
φA(B) = 1 if and only if A ⊆ B (10)
This is similar to the case at classical physics, where the duals were single element
subsets (corresponding to characteristic maps). For convenience we will occasionally
identify the co-events with its dual.
7 See also Ref. [12] for related work.
8 Earlier alternative definitions were use as in Ref. [6] but this turned out to be the most satisfactory due to
several reasons.
9 e.g. “I am physicist”-True, along with “Physicists are humans”-True, implies that “I am human”-True.
10 at least for finite dimensional history space Ω but similar considerations can be generalized after taking care.
11 In literature, the dual is also referred occasionally as the “suport”.
(ii) We require that every subset of measure zero is always mapped to zero (i.e. it is always
false).
µ(A) = 0⇒ φ(A) = 0 (11)
Co-events obeying equaiton 11 are called preclusive. This requirement is same as in classical
physics, where the histories that are (or belong to a set) of measure zero cannot occur, in
other words are not possible realities.
(iii) We require that the co-event (or actually its dual) is primitive. This means the following:
We (partially) order all possible duals (which are simply subsets of Ω) with respect to set
inclusion. Then from all the (multiplicative) preclusive co-events we choose only those that
are minimal with respect to this order, i.e. the finest grained (smaller) duals. Remember
that in classical physics, these are simply single element subsets (hi), so by requiring
primitivity we come as close as possible to the picture we have in classical physics.
We therefore get to the point where we identify these co-events, which are (multiplicative),
preclusive and primitive, as possible realities (PPC). The multiplicativity, allows us to view
the relevant duals as what actually happens, and thus we have a very similar picture with
classical physics, where the difference is that reality is no longer a fine-grained description but
rather a coarser-grained one12. A very interesting thing to point out here, is that the logic that
arises, depends on the dynamics (and initial condition), via the use of the quantum measure
(the zero sets) and it is not fixed a-priori.
Before moving to the main text of this contribution, we shall stress one more interesting
point. Classical physics corresponds to homomorphisms while the “quantum” nature is encoded
in the parts of the map that are anhomomorphic. Thus we could say that a classical domain
arises if we consider some coarse graining (i.e. some subalgebra of U) such that the induced map
on this subalgebra, is a homomorphism for ANY of the allowed (PPC) co-events. What is most
interesting, is that with this notion of a classical domain there exists a unique finest grained
classical domain that all the others arise as coarse-grainings. This is in striking difference with
consistent histories where the main problem was the existence of many incompatible classical
domains. The reader is once again refered to Ref. [8] for details.
3. Probabilities in Anhomomorphic Logic
3.1. Probabilities in Classical Closed Systems: Cournot Principle
In the analysis we have done so far, we have argued about what a possible reality is (a PPC
co-event), but have omitted what is probable. In most everyday life cases, the predictions
we get (particularly from quantum theory) are probabilistic. However here we shall recall
that in consistent histories we have a single closed system, and in such cases the very concept
of probability (in classical physics) is not easily and unambiguously defined. For example a
probabilistic statement about the state of the full universe cannot be testable, since either
outcome (finding universe possessing the property in question or not) would not falsify our
initial assertion.
There was a big philosophical debate by the founders of probability theory on how one is
expect to understand a probabilistic statement13. The standpoint which we shall adopt (which
suits best the case of a single closed system such as the universe) is the use of the Cournot
Principle, and is closely related with experimentally falsifying a theory :
12We can view this, as either finer grained questions are un-physical, or physics at finer grained scales has some
(classically) contradictory properties.
13 See for example Kolmogorov in the “Grundbegriffe”.
(Strong) Cournot Principle: In a repeated trial, an event A of small measure (ǫ
arbitrarily chosen), does not occur.
Note that in a repeated trial, distributions of outcomes that differ drastically from the
probability distribution of the single trial, would have very small measure and thus they do not
occur. However, this picture is problematic in classical physics. To see this, we can consider
the case of tossing a fair coin. The probability measure of having all heads in N trials, goes as
1/2N , while the probability of getting heads less than (say) 60% is
∑
0.6N
k=1
(
N
k
)
which is much
greater than 1/2N . We could thus claim that an outcome of all heads is impossible, while an
outcome with 50% heads is possible. However, we note, that in any actual realization (series
of outcomes), we will get a sequence of results (e.g. httthtthht · · ·) that has probability of
occurring 1/2N exactly the same with the one we get with only heads. This probability was
very small (< ǫ) and thus this outcome was prohibited. In this example, we note that any
possible outcome has measure less than ǫ and if we take the (strong) Cournot seriously that
would come to a direct contradiction with reality (since something actually happens). Such
considerations lead us to a milder version of the Cournot principle:
Weak Cournot Principle: In a repeated trial, an event A singled out in advance,
of small measure (ǫ arbitrarily chosen), will not occur.
This means that if we ask in advance: “Is the outcome 50% heads possible” we will get the
answer yes. However, if we ask in advance “will the sequence hththththt occur” we will get the
answer no, since the measure for this outcome is small. We should stress here that there is a
split between the ontology and predictability of the theory. According to weak Cournot, any
outcome that doesn’t have identically zero measure, is possible. However if we have a theory
and we ask a question that has small (< ǫ) non-zero measure, if this outcome occurs, we falsify
our theory, even if our theory did not exclude this event from occuring. For example, if N coin
tosses give N heads, we falsify our assertion that the coin was fair, even if it is conceivable
that it was a fair coin. To sum up, in strong Cournot, no approximately zero measure set is a
possible reality, while in weak Cournot, approximately zero measure sets are possible realities.
In order to make scientific predictions, we need to preselect questions and we may need to falsify
our theory even if the experimental outcome is (ontologically speaking) a possible reality.
Coming back to the case of a closed single system, note that while we cannot make a
probabilistic statement for the universe itself, we can instead make probabilistic predictions
for subsystems that ‘look identical’. In the above example we made statements about the
distribution of outcomes of tosses of coins (subsystems). These statements, if we view them
as statements about coins, correspond to non-trivial probabilities. However, they correspond
to ‘almost trivial’ (i.e. almost zero or almost one) probabilities for the full system of N coins.
The reader is refered to Ref. [8] for further details.
3.2. Quantum Theory
One of the things that stopped us from taking the strong Cournot seriously, was the fact that
we had an example that all Ω was covered by histories (possible outcomes, hi’s
14) each of
which was precluded because it had measure µ(hi) < ǫ. This resembles the Kochen Specker
theorem. Anhomomorphic logic, by considering as possible realities subsets of Ω other than
singletons (fine-grained histories hi), had evaded this contradiction. One would hope that it
may be possible to take strong Cournot seriously in the quantum case, by defining Approximate
14Note that by hi here we mean a sequence of single outcomes, as for example hththththt in the coin case.
PPC (APPC) co-events by replacing the condition ‘µ(A) = 0’ with the condition ‘µ(A) < ǫ’
in the definition of preclusion. (c.f. with Eq.11). We hope that by making this change we
can encode all the ‘useful’ information in the quantum measure in our set of APPC co-events;
then the quantum measure itself would no longer be needed for predictions. However this leads
to contradictions with observation. For if the dual of a co-event contains two histories giving
different answers to a particular question, then the co-event itself will answer our question in a
manner inconsistent with Boolean logic; even when this question relates to an experimentlaly
observable outcome (see Ref. [8] for further details). For example, returning to our repeated
trial of a coin, assume we have a APPC co-event that has in its dual one history that has a
heads outcome in the first coin toss, and a second history that has a tails outcome. Then by
the definition of anhomomorphic logic, we would get NO to the question “did the first coin
toss result in heads?” and also NO to the question “did the first coin toss result in tails”. But
we can experimentally verify that exactly one of the two outcomes ‘heads’, ‘tails’ will actually
occur if we are to throw our coin. Such co-events (that are possible for APPC co-events), would
not be possible had we stick with exactly preclusive co-events (see Ref. [8] for further details).
We are then pushed back to the use of the weak Cournot.
In quantum theory when we use weak Cournot, the possible realities are still the PPC co-
events (c.f. in classical physics, possible realities were fine grained histories, that had non-zero
measure, even if it was arbitrarily small). To deduce probabilistic predictions we need to use
once again the quantum measure. We select a question corresponding to a subset A of the
history space Ω. If µ(A) < ǫ, we say that this result is not possible, and this is the prediction
we make. If this outcome actually arises, we then say that our initial assumption about what
was the quantum measure (which includes initial conditions and dynamics) has been falsified.
Note, the following difference of the quantum case compared to the classical one. In classical
physics the measure that is used to derive predictions, is on the space of possible realities, which
is the history space. In quantum theory, the quantum measure is again on the history space,
however this is no longer the space of possible realities, since the possible realities are the PPC
co-events. The reader is refered to Ref. [8] for further details.
3.3. The Double Slit Example
Finally, let us show how the quantum measure can be used along with weak Cournot to get
predictions that reproduce the double slit pattern. For simplicity we will consider a discrete
screen, with 5 slots (i ∈ {0,±1,±2})15 . We also have two slits (s1, s2). Each fine grained
history (for a single repetition), consists from the particle crossing one slit and hitting the
screen at on slot. The measure is given:
|(sj , i)| = 0.1
|(s1, i)| ⊔ (s2, i)| =
{
0.3 if i = ±2, 0
0.05 i = ±1
|(sk, i) ⊔ (sl, j)| = |(sk, i)|+ |(sl, j)|
= 0.2 if i 6= j
If we have many independent repetitions we can simply use the product measure. Now
assume that we have a closed system with 10 particles that are to cross this double slit, and we
assume that anything that has measure less than ǫ = 10−3 is precluded, meaning that if such
15 Slots 0 and ±2 are the bright fringes and ±1 the dark fringes of the pattern.
outcome comes we falsify our initial theory (according to the weak Cournot). We can easily see
that the question “Is the distribution uniform” consists of all the permutations where we have 2
particles at each slot, and this number is
(
10
2
)(
8
2
)(
6
2
)(
4
2
)
= 113400 which is much larger than the
number of permutations for getting the double slit pattern (i.e. 3 particles at ±2, 0 slots and 1
at either 1 or -1). The latter is 4800. However the measure for each fine grained history of 10
particles that are uniformly distributed is only ≈ 5 × 10−9. The total measure of all histories
that are of uniform distribution is then 113400×5×10−9 ≈ 5×10−4. This is less than ǫ, so the
uniform distribution is precluded. In contrast while there are much fewer combinations that
give the double slit distribution, the measure for each of them is ≈ 10−6 and thus the total
measure for getting a distribution ‘like’ the double slit pattern is 4800×10−6 ≈ 5×10−3, which
is greater than ǫ and thus the double slit distribution is not ruled out by our theory16. Here,
in this simplified model, we see how predictions of the type of double slit pattern (i.e. ruling
out distributions such as the uniform one) can arise in anhomomorphic logic, when we use the
quantum measure of many repetitions of the system along with the weak Cournot principle.
4. Summary and Conclusions
In this contribution, we reviewed the anhomomorphic logic approach to quantum theory, which
is a development of the consistent histories approach. Reality is no longer a single fine grained
history, but a primitive preclusive multiplicative co-event, which can also be viewed as a coarse
grained history. The Kochen Specker theorem is evaded, as is the problem of many incompatible
classical domains faced by consistent histories. The core of this contribution was how to deal
with probabilistic predictions in this formalism. We resorted to the Cournot principle to give
meaning to probabilistic statements and essentially in a frequentist’s view on probability (rather
than propensity). The use of strong Cournot principle was ruled out (alas for different reasons
than in classical physics). The weak Cournot, introduces a split of ontology and predictions.
In classical physics this leads to:
(a) Ontology: Fine grained histories are the possible realities. In other words one and only
one history is actually realized.
(b) Predictions: The (classical) measure on Ω is used, in order to make predictions, that are
of the type “if A is realized and µc(A) ≤ ǫ then our initial assumption is rejected”.
In quantum theory the picture is similar:
(a) Ontology: Possible realities are the multiplicative, primitive and (exactly) preclusive co-
events. If we view the dual picture (the duals), we can say that what is realized is a coarse
grained set of histories or else a non-trivial subset of Ω.
(b) Predictions: The quantum measure on Ω is used, in order to make predictions, that are
of the type “if A is realized and µ(A) ≤ ǫ then our initial assumption is rejected”. Note
however, the fact that the quantum measure is on the history space, which in the quantum
case, is no longer the space of possible realities.
16Note, however, that if we asked more detailed question, such as “the first particle will hit slot 0, the second
slot 2, etc” even if the distribution was correct the measure would be very small (≈ 10−6 here) and thus ruled
out by our predictions. The “paradox” here, as in classical physics, would be that the eventual outcome of the
experiment, would be one of those ruled out histories, and the contradiction is evaded by the crucial concept of
pre-selected questions, in the definition of weak Cournot.
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